Ujjwal Guin, Ph.D., IEEE Senior Member

Godbold Associate Professor
Co-Graduate Program Officer (Co-GPO)
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Auburn University
325 Broun Hall, Auburn, AL 36849-5201, USA
Email: ujjwal.guin at auburn dot edu
Phone: (334) 844-1835 (Office)
[Curriculum vitae][Google Scholar][Research Gate]


SAE Counterfit Defect Coverage Tool

CDC is a web-based tool that estimates the effectiveness of a sequence of tests to screen for counterfeit parts. The output of this tool consists of estimates of the following: the counterfeit defect coverage (CDC), the not-covered defects (NCD), the under- covered defects (UCD), and the counterfeit type coverage (CTC). For further information regarding this tool, refer to SAE International's Test Method, AS6171/1 "Suspect/Counterfeit Test Evaluation Method."

See cdctool.sae.org for more information and access to the tool.

Design-for-Security (DFS)

The DFS program parses the netlist file of a synthisized design and inserts key gates connected to randomly selected wires. The program then generates a modified netlist file with the newly inserted gates. This is used in the Design-for-Security architecture that proposes to insert a secure cell in addition to the key gates to ensure the key is not leaked during manufacturing tests.

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Exhaustive Key Search on AES

The program exhaustively simulate all 2^8=256 key bytes k under each possible combinations of p and p' that satisfies equation s(p + k) + s(p' + k) = m, with constraint p != p'. The exhaustive search shows that there are 128 unique values for all 256 combinations of k under any fixed p, p' and p != p'. This is an interesting property for the nonlinearity of AES Sbox.

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Exhaustive Key Search on GIFT-COFB

The program performs exhaustive search on all 2^4=16 key cells k that satisfies equation s(q + k) + s(q' + k) = l, for all possible q, q', k, and q != q' under GF(2^4) and GIFT's S-box. We observed that: (1) there are multiple solutions of k (for all 16 combinations) which have the same value of l of under any fixed q, q' and q != q'; (2) 416 pairs of {q, q',q''} (out of 560 possibilities) which allow the attacker to uniquely identify the correct value for a 4-bit key.

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