CVAT – Counterfeit Verification & Analysis Tool
CVAT is a web-based optimization application developed through U.S. Army-funded research at Auburn University that supplements SAE Standard AS6171. Using a branch-and-bound algorithm, it identifies the optimal combination of test methods that maximizes defect detection coverage while adhering to user-defined cost and time budgets.
The tool draws on two data sources: Subject Matter Expert (SME) assessments, where experienced professionals rated each test method's ability to detect each defect, and Round Robin empirical data collected from multiple well-established test labs that regularly perform AS6171 testing. In the round robin evaluation, all participating labs received comparable test samples — ranging from active complex to passive simple architectures — of both known pedigree and suspect counterfeit parts. Each lab identified the AS6171-defined counterfeit defects detected by each test method, producing measures of both detectability (whether a method could detect a given defect) and proficiency (how likely a lab would detect it).
Users can select either SME data alone or a weighted blend of SME and Round Robin data when configuring a run.
See anticounterfeit.eng.auburn.edu for more information and access to the tool.
anticounterfeit.eng.auburn.edu
SAE Counterfit Defect Coverage Tool
CDC is a web-based tool that estimates the effectiveness of a sequence of tests to screen for counterfeit parts. The output of this tool consists of estimates of the following: the counterfeit defect coverage (CDC), the not-covered defects (NCD), the under- covered defects (UCD), and the counterfeit type coverage (CTC). For further information regarding this tool, refer to SAE International's Test Method, AS6171/1 "Suspect/Counterfeit Test Evaluation Method."
See cdctool.sae.org for more information and access to the tool.
Design-for-Security (DFS)
The DFS program parses the netlist file of a synthisized design and inserts key gates connected to randomly selected wires. The program then generates a modified netlist file with the newly inserted gates. This is used in the Design-for-Security architecture that proposes to insert a secure cell in addition to the key gates to ensure the key is not leaked during manufacturing tests.
Exhaustive Key Search on AES
The program exhaustively simulate all 2^8=256 key bytes k under each possible combinations of p and p' that satisfies equation s(p + k) + s(p' + k) = m, with constraint p != p'. The exhaustive search shows that there are 128 unique values for all 256 combinations of k under any fixed p, p' and p != p'. This is an interesting property for the nonlinearity of AES Sbox.
Exhaustive Key Search on GIFT-COFB
The program performs exhaustive search on all 2^4=16 key cells k that satisfies equation s(q + k) + s(q' + k) = l, for all possible q, q', k, and q != q' under GF(2^4) and GIFT's S-box. We observed that: (1) there are multiple solutions of k (for all 16 combinations) which have the same value of l of under any fixed q, q' and q != q'; (2) 416 pairs of {q, q',q''} (out of 560 possibilities) which allow the attacker to uniquely identify the correct value for a 4-bit key.